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Introduction
　　In　l9921began　an　essay　on”Toward　a　Global　Hermeneutic　of
Justification　in　Process　Perspective：Luther　and　Shinran　Comparatively
Considered”1with　these　words：
Today，　theology　is　no　longer　an　exclusively　Western　enterprise，
one　that　Eastern　peOpleS　whether　Chnstian　or　not　have　merely
and　lopsidedly　to　learn　in　order　to　construe　their　religious
perceptions　of　the　world　in　inte皿図ble　and　coherent　manners　2
Contemporary　theology　moves　toward　a　world，　or　global，
theology　inasmuch　as　Eastem　and　Westem　peOples　alike　share
one　and　the　same　world－the　earth－although　they　do　so　in
their　distinctively　pecUliar　and　unique　ways，　religiously　and
culturally　spealdng．（”Toward　a　Globat”　103）
　　What　I　have　in　mind　now　with　respect　to　the　status　of”religious　education
in　a　world　of　religious　diversity，”which　is　the　general　theme　fbr　the　l　Sth
Intemational　Seminar　on　Religious　Education　and　Values，　is　expressible　in
similar　terms　if　the　notion　of　theology　in　the　above　passage　is　regarded　as
interchangeable　with　the　notion　of　religious　education．　As　Wi1丘ed　Cantwell
Smith　superbly　attests，”What　is　begiming　to　happen　around　the　earth　today
is　the　incredibly　exciting　development　that　will　eventually　mean　that　each
person，　certainly　each　group，　participates　in　the　religious　community　of
humankind－as　self－consciously　the　context　of　faith．”By　saying　this　Smith
does　not　mean　that　Christians　will　cease　to　be　Christian　or　Muslims　Muslim．
What　he　means　is　that　Christians　will　participate，　as　Christians，　in　the
religious　history　of　humankind，　Muslims　will　participate　in　it　as　Muslims，
Jews　as　Jews，　Hindus　as　Hindus，　and　Buddhists　as　Buddhists．”For，
ultimately，”Smith　claims，”the　only　community　there　is，　the　one　to　which　I
2㎞ow　that　I血ly　belong，　is　the　community，　world－wide　and　history－long，　of
humankind．”3
　　1n　a　word，　religious　education　in　today曾s　religiously　pluralistic　world　is　a
lofty　enterprise　which　is　responsible　fbr　taking　into　account　the　only
community　there　is，　that　is，　the　community，　world－wide　and　history－10ng，　of
humankind，　to　which　we　know　we　truly　belong　despite　the　fact　that　we
participate　in　it　as　distinctively　unique　religionists－Christians　as　Christians，
Muslims　as　Muslims，　Jews　as　Jews，　Hindus　as　Hindus，　and　Buddhists　as
Buddhists．　Put　differently，　religious　education　is　to　be　understood　as　an
enterprise　which　is　shot　through　with　the　notion　of　unity　in　diversity　in　a
very　meaningfUl　manner．　By　being　so，　it　is　required　to　be　symbolically
referential　to　the　unity　in　diversity　of　our　world　in　the　21st　century．　If　we　are
really　concerned　with　religious　education　in　terms　of　unity－in－diversity，　we
will　be　equally　eager　to　create　a　world　which　exists　in　unity－in－diversity，丘ee
丘om　the　bondage　to　an　overarching　power　of　coercion　but　also　not
entrapped　in　the　grip　of　an　anarchical　relativism　or　separatism
　　In　what　follows　let　me　argue　for　a　specific　exemplification　of　the　unity　in
diversity　formation　in　religious　education　in　terms　of　Buddhist－Christian
pedagogy　ln　process　perspectlve・
　　First，　I　show　the　intention　of　my　Buddhist－Christian　pedagogy　by
discussing　my　teacher　Katsumi　Takizawa’s　argument　about　the　compatibility
of　Japanese　novelist　Soseki　Natsume，s　famous　work　Kokoro（which　means
in　English”Heart”and　was　published　in　lgl4）with　the　Gospels．　There
appear　in　these　works，　Takizawa　argues，　the　Eastem　and　Westem　ways　of
master－disciple　relationship　in　depth　when　two　teachers，　Sensei　and　Jesus，
die，　the　former　by　his　own　hand　and　the　latter　by　the　crucifixion，　while
leaving　their　respective　messages　of　tmth．
　　Second，　I　scrutinize　and　a面culate　the　Eastem　and　Western　messages　of
truth　by　way　of　studying　Alfred　North　Whitehead’s　A　ims｛）f　Education
（1929）fbcusing　on　two　of　his　ideas，　reverence　and　duty．　The　two
pedagogical　ideas　seem　to　be　related　to　each　other　quite　paradoxically．
　　Concem　with　their　paradoxical　intra－relationship　is　at　the　core　of　my
Buddhist－Christian　pedagogy．　However，　consideration　of　this　important
issue　will　be　attempted　carefUlly　after　I　argue，　third，　f（）r　the　parallelism
between　Whitehead’s　threefbld　developmental　concept　of　pedagogy　with
3romance，　precision，　and　generalization　at　its　core　and　Kitaro　Nishida’s
philosophy　of　pure　experience　which　he　expresses　in　the　Preface　to　his
maiden　workオ〃血g〃砂’扉o　the　Good（1911）with　these　words：’曾I　wanted
to　explain　all　things　on　the　basis　ofpure　experience　as　the　sole　reality．vv　4
　　Fourth　and　last，　I　make　some　concluding　remarks．
1　．　Soseki　Natsume’s　Kokoro　and　the　Gospels：Katsumi　T劉kizawa，s
　　　View　of　Their　Unity　in　Diversity
　　　In　encounter　with　Karl　Barth曾s　lectures　on　the　Incamation－《coηα脚5
de　Spか’珈Sancto，　natus　ex　Maria　virgine》－at　the　Theological　Faculty，
University　of　Bonn　in　the　summer　of　1934，　Katsumi　Takizawa　came　to
notice，　with　Barth，　that”from　here　one　can　read　even　Goethe　quite
differently”（Ger．：von　hier　aus　kann　man　auch　Goethe　ganz　anders　lesen）．5
By”here”Takizawa　meant　what　he　used　to　call　the　Proto如m　lmmanuel
or　the　fUndamental　fact　that　God　is”with　us”without　reservation，　In　his
case，　the　Proto－factu〃21mmanuel　is　undergirding　the　human　existence　of
every　person　even　prior　to　the　Incamation　of　the　Etemal　Word　of　God　in　the
person　and　history　of　Jesus　of　Nazareth．　For　Takizawa，　when　Jesus　said，”I
say　to　you，　befbre　Abraham　was，　I　am”（John　8：58），　what　he　meant　by　the
”1”is’傭universal．Proto－factum　ImmanueL　By　contrast，　fbr　Barth，　the
Proto如m　lmmanuel”came　to　be”in　Jesus　as　the　Christ－this　point　of
divergence　between　Takizawa　and　Barth　which　has　long　been　critically
clarified　by　Takizawa　in　dialogue　with　Barth　since　l　934．
　　What　motivated　Takizawa　to　study　carefUlly　Soseki，　a　Zen－inspired
writer，　and　other　great　men　of　literature，　including　Ryunosuke　Akutagawa
and　Dostoevsky，　was　this　perspective　of　the　universal　Pアoto－factum
Immanuel　i曲erent　at　the　core　of　everyone’s　existence．　Takizawa　writes：
KokOro，㎜ong　others，　greatly　astonished　me．　Despite　profound　differences
and　contrasts　between　Jesus，　extreme　positiveness　in　the　Gospels　and　the
protagonist　Sensei’s　extreme　llegativeness　in　Kokoro，　between　the
crucifixion　and　a　hidden　suicide　in　particUlar，　this　work　by　Soseki，　when　I
read　it　with　a　humble　heart，　has　re曲ded　me　willy一㎡11y　of　the　four　Gospels
that　spoke　of　a　person　named　Jesus　in　their　unique　ways．（、4LK　57）
4　　Takizawal　s　study　ofκoんoro　was　published　in　1956　under　the　title　Sosein’　’s
’7（bkoro”and　the　Gospels　by　Yoyosha　and　now　is　contained　in　Takizawa
Katsu〃ii　Chosakushu（Works）published　by　Hozokan　in　Kyoto　in　l　973．　The
above　quotation　comes　from　his　report　on　the”1977－78　Academic　Visit　to
Germany．”　Takizawa　is　able　to　summarize　what　he　has　learned　from　Soseki’s
Kokoro　more　fUlly　so　as　to　say：
In　a　nutshell，　what　is　at　the　core　of　KokOro　is　a　confirmation　of　the　ve］tyfact，
which　Ichiro，　the　protagonist　in　the　previous　work（｝yoonin（The　Zen
Practitioner），　deplores，　that”there　is　no　bridge丘om　person　to　person．”
However，　Soseki　who　accomplished　KokOro，　in　distinction　from　lchiro　in
6ンoo伽，　does　not　think　to　escape丘om　th　is　fact　1ying　at　the　bOttom　of　life
and　history，　by　means　of　a　bond，　however　it　may　be　strong，　illtimate，　and
beautifU1－a　bond　such　as”love”or”religion”or　whatever　else　in　the　world．
This　is　neither　because　he　does　not　acknowledge　the　loftiness　of　these
human　relationships，　nor　because　he　does　not　love　the廿beauty．　Quite　on　the
contrary．　It　is　because　he　p血es　these　reladonships　immensely　that　Sensei
（Teacher）in　K（）kOro　cannot　but　warn　his　young　disciple　against　falling　into　a
ravine　carelessly　owing　to　his　complacent　self－enjoyment．　Don’t　be　fbrgetfUl
of　that　stUbbOrn　fact　while　arrested　by　the　sin　of　absolutiZing　something　in
the　world（AK　59－60）
　　Takizawa　regards　Sensei’s　above　waming　to　his　disciple　and　his　own
death　as　tmly　pedagogic．　However，　significantly　enough，　unlike　Jesus
Sensei　is　not　aware　of　an”absolute　relationship”within　the　stubborn　fact　of
human　existence．　The　invisible　su切ect　of　this　unconditional　relationship
Jesus　called　the”Father　who　sees　in　secret”（AK，64）．　His　final　cry　on　the
cross，”Eloi，　Eloi，　lama　sabachthani？”or　9’My　God，　My　God，　why　have　you
fbrsaken　me？”is　disclosing　a”truly　intimate　and　absolutely　unchanging
relationship（which　is　simply　without　reason）between　God　and　humans，
including　Jesus　and　us曾’（AK，66）．　It　is　only　ffom　this，　Takizawa　claims，　that
we　can　clearly　see　why　Soseki’s　Kokoro　and　the　Gospels　constitute　a
contrast，　which　is　like　a　contrast　betWeen　light　and　darkness，　although　based
upon　one　and　the　same　fUndamental　fact（AK，66）．　If　this　is　so，　we　can　find
adeeper　pedagogy　in　the　Gospels．
5　　Thus　far，　we　have　come　to　the　point　where　we　can　distinguish　between　a
trustworthy　pedagogy　by　Sensei　which　is　sensitive　to　the　stubbom　fact　of
human　existence　and　a　deeper　pedagogy　by　Jesus　which　leads　us　into　an
insight　into　its　background，　the伽如m　lmmanuel．　This　distinction　is
crucial　because　we　thus　are　led　to　know　that　a　true　pedagogy　gives　us　a
㎞owledge　of　antinomy，　such　as　the　following　one　Sensei　discloses　in　Part
One，　Ch．13　when　he　says：”At　any　rate，10ve　is　evil．　You　see．　And　it　is
sacred．”6But　this　does　not　give　us　a　solution　to　the　antinomy．
　　Ihave　a　hunch　that　when　Soseki　presents　the　antinomy　of　love　throughout
Kokoro　what　he　tnlly　desires　to　refer　to　is　the　problem　of　patriotism　that
existed　at　the　end　of　the　Meiji　Era．　It　seems　that　love　is　a　metaphor　fbr
patriotism．　This　assumption　might　be　supported　by　the　fact　that　Soseki
wrote　an　essay　entitled”Man－Kan　tokorodokoro9，（A　Trip　to　Manchuria　and
Korea）in　l　909．　He　wrote　Kokoro　in　l　914；five　years　later．　Which　means
that　Soseki　had　an　ample　time　of　pondering　the　destiny　of　Japan　which
might　have　been　driven　by　the　antinomy　of　patriotism．　Soseki　then　might
have　wanted　to　say：サ’At　any　rate，　patriotism　is　evil．　You　see．　And　it　is
sacred．韓
　　If　my　hunch　is　correct，　the　story　that　Sensei’s丘iend”K”（which　suggests
Manchuria　and　Korea）in　his　college　days　killed　himself　because　Sensei
defeated　him　in　a　t　riangular　love　relationship　with　a　girl　who　is　his　present
wife，　might　have　had　a　metaphorical－political　comotation　in　Soseki「s　mind．
And　Japanese　patriotism，　although　it　might　have　been　perceived　by　most
Japanese　during　the　Meiji　Era　as　having　an　authentic　background　in　the
success飢social／national　reform　of　the　Meij　i　Restoration，　thus　sacred，　might
be　a　suspect　of　the　cause　of　wars　within　the　context　of　East　Asian　history
then　and　in　the　fUture　time．　If　read　against　this　sort　of　background，　Soseki’s
pedagogy　of　antinomy　is　cynically　effective　in　educating　us　in　the　matter　of
patriotism　as　well　as　in　the　matter　of　love　affairs　even　in　our　centUry．　Global
citizens　cannot　be　self：complacent　in　the　matter　of　patriotism，　saying
”patriotism　is　no　evil”or”9／11justifies　patriotism”or”our　new　constitution
must　have　a　preamble　on　patriotism．”Yet，　patriotism　is　sacred．　But　how
can　we　say　sO？
II．　The　Aims　of　Education　in　Whitehead’s　Process　Pedagogy　of　Rhythm：
6　　Duty　and　Reverence
　　In　the　foregoing　section　we　acknowledged　that　while　Sensei　in　Soseki’s
Kokoro　wanted　to　give　his　young　disciple　a　cynical　sense　of　truth　about　the
antinomy　inherent　in　love　and　patriotism，　Jesus’cry　on　the　cross　urged　his
disciples　to　have　an　insight　into　the　bottom　of　the　fact　of　human　existence，
which　Takizawa　designates　as　the　Pro’o喚c伽刑Immanuel．　Now，
Whitehead　says　something　great　about　a　true　pedagogy　dealing　with　a
cynical　knowledge　of　factual　antinomy　and　a　deeper　pedagogy　of　Jesus
resulting丘om　his　talking　to　the　Father　who　sees　in　secret．　He　takes　up　two
ideas，　duty　and　reverence，　as　the　poles　of　his　pedagogy・「冊itehead　says：
［A］We　can　be　content　wi止no　les曲血e　old　summary　of　educational
ideal　which　has　been　current　at　any　time　from血e（lawn　of　our　civiliZation．
The　essence　of　education　is　that　it　be　religious．　Pray，　what　is　religious
education？Areligious　education　is　an　education　which　inculcates　duty　and
reverence．　Duty　arises　fr（）m　our　potential　control　over　the　course　of　events．
Where　attainable　knowledge　have　changed血e　issue，　igrtorance　has　the　guile
of　vice．　And　the　fbundation　of　reverence　is　this　percepdon，　that　the　present
holds　within　itself　the　complete　sum　of　existence，　backwards　and　fbrwards，
that　whole　amplitude　of　t㎞e，　which　is　etemity．7
［B］But　above　style，　and　above㎞owledge，　there　is　something，　a　vague
shape　1ike　fate　above　the（｝reek　gods．　That　something　is　Power．　Style　is　the
魚shionhlg　of　power，　the　restraining　of　pOwer．　But，　after　all，　the　power　of
a血㎞ent　of血e　desセed　end　is㎞（㎞en血1．　ne㎞t曲g　is　to　get山ere．
Do　not　bother　about　your　style，　but　solve　your　problem，　justifシthe　ways　of
God　to　man，　administer　your　province，　or　do　whatever　else　is　set　befbre　you．
（JG，12）
　　Let　me　deal　with　the　latter　quotation　first．　I　think　Whitehead’s　pedagogy
as　stated　in　B　above　is　neatly　descriptive　of　what　duty　is　all　about．　It　is
interesting　to　see　here　that　he　relies　upon　the　old　Christian　tradition　of
theodicy　in　order　to　talk　about　duty　in　education．　We　know　that　P．　T．
Fors）rth　in　the　Preface　to　his　famous　volume　Theノお峨6α’∫oηqプGo4　wrote：
7We　are　all　familiar　more　or　less　with　one　noble　worK　equally　of
faith　and　of　an　whose　object　was　stated　on　its　front　to　be
　　　　　　　　　　To　Vi血dicate　Eterna1　ProVidencq
　　　　　　　　　　And　justify　the　ways　of　God　to　marL
That　is　a　theodicy，　the　attempt　to　adjust　the　ways　of　God　to
conscience．　But　to　His　own　conscience　above　alL　8
　　At　the　present　stage　in　this　essay　it　would　be　sufficiently　to　the　point　if　I
mentioned　that　Whitehead，s　pedagogy　B，　which　is　a　pedagogy　of　duty　as
theodicy，　in　the　sense　of　the　attempt　to　a（加st　the　ways　of　God　to　conscience，
fits　in　with　Soseki’s　pedagogy　of　urging　toward　the　conscientious　knowledge
of　antinomy　in　the　matters　of　love　and　patriotism．　However，　this　side　of
Whitehead’s　pedagogy，　which　is　pedagogy　B，　duty，　cannot　realize　itself
unless　it　is　motivated　by　a　deeper　cause，　reverence，　which　let　me　call
Whitehead曾s　pedagogy　A，　which　is　inclusive，　as　is　clear　from　the　above，　of
Whitehead’s　pedagogy　B．
　　Inasmuch　as　Whiteheadls　pedagogy　A，　reverence，　is　based　upon　the
perception　that　the　present　holds　within　itselfthe　complete　sum　of　existence，
backwards　and　fbrwards，　that　whole　amplitude　of　time，　which　is　etemity，　it
is　akin　to　Takizawa’s　idea　of　the．Proto－factu〃11mmanuel，　which　is
identifiable　with　the　Father　who　sees”in　secret”－that　is，　at　the　hidden　core
of　human　existence　of　ours，　including　Jesus，　existence．　But　the　important
problem　is　to　know　how　pedagogy　A，　reverence，　is　related　to　pedagogy　B，
duty．　It　seems　to　me　that　when　Whitehead，　in　Ch．　II”The　Rhythm　of
Education”and　Ch．　III’曾The　Rhythmic　Claims　of　Freedom　and　Discipline，”
speaks　of　the　triadic　development　of　romance，　precision，　and　generalization
in　education，　he　must　have　come　to　the　solution　to　this　problem．　Yet，　how
this　is　so　is　still　unclear　to　me．
　　The　fbllowing　dictum　by　Whitehead　is　pivotal　in　understanding　the
necessity　of　containing　the　three　stages　of　romance，　precision，　and
generalization　in　his　process　pedagogy．　Whitehead　insightfUlly　discloses：
Education　must　esse曲11y　be　a　setting　in　order　of　a　femient　already　stirring
in　the　mind：you　cannot　educate　mind　in　vacuo．　In　our　conception　of
education　we　tend　to　con血e　it　to血e　second　stage　of　the　cycle；namely，　to
8the　stage　of　precision．　But　we　cannot　so　limit　our　task　without
misconceiving　the　whole　problem．　We　are　concerned　alike　with　the
色㎜ent，　wi出the　acqu廿ement　of　precision，　and　with血e　subsequent伽ition．
（AE，18）
　　Now，　it　is　clear　that　Whitehead　grasps　education　as　a　double　problem，1not
as　two　distinct　problems．　Ontologically　speaking，　there　has　to　be　a　ferment
already　stirring　in　the　mind　while，　however，　f士om　the　perspective　of
formation，　it　appears　that　there　would　be　no　education　apa貢丘om　the　work
of　a　setting　in　order　of　the　ferment　in　question．　This　grasp　of　the　ma賃er　of
education　is　reminiscent　of　Whitehead’s　doctrine　of　perception　in　terms　of
，°symbolic　re飴rence”whose　gist　he　brilliantly　depicts　in　these　terms：
　　The　contrast　between　the　comparative　emptiness　of
Presentational　lmmediacy　and　the　deep　significance　dlsclcsed
by　Causal　Efficacy　is　at　the　r∞t　of　the　pathos　which　haunts　the
worl己
　　　　　　　　　’Pereunt　et　imputantur’
is　the　inscription　on　old　sundials血‘rel図ous，　housest
　　　　　’The　hours　pehsh　and　are　laid　to　account．’9
　　Here”Pereunt，”according　to　Whitehead，　refers　to”the　world　disclosed　in
immediate　presentation，　gay　with　a　thousand　tints，　passing，　and　intrinsically
meaningless．旧’Imputantur，”by　contrast，　refers　to　”the　world　disclosed　in　its
causal　efficacy，　where　each　event　infects　the　ages　to　come，　fbr　good　or　fbr
evil，　with　its　own　individuality”（S，47）．　Thus，　almost　all　pathos　includes”a
reference　to　lapse　of　time”（S，47）．
111．Kitaro　Nishidaワs　Philosophy　of　Pure　Experience　As　Guide：Toward
　　　a　Buddhist－Christi劉n　Pedagogy　of　Rhythm
　　Given　the　necessity　of　both　romance　and　precision，　we　now　can　pursue　a
similar　manifestation　of　the　double　problem（i．e．，　reverence　cum　duty；or，
romance　cum　precision）in　Kitaro　Nishida’s　philosophy冒冒ofl’pure
experience．　Significantly　enough，　the鱒of’in　Nishida’s　philosophy　of　pure
experience　signifies，　first，　the　subj　ective　genitive　case　in　which　it　is　pure
9experience　itself　that　comes　to　be　philosophizing；and　it　signifies，　secondly，
the　o切ective　genitive　case　in　which　one　philosophically　looks　upon　pure
experience　as　the　sole　reality．
　　Ihave　already　referred　to　Nishida’s　famous　dictum：”I　wanted　to　explain
all　things　on　the　basis　of　pure　experience　as　the　sole　reality．”　In　explicating
this　Shizuteru　Ueda　proposes　that　the　first　dimension，　pure　experience，　is　an
ineffable　occurrence，　qua　the　proto－word，　which　unfblds　of　itself　into　the
second　dimension，　the　Gru〃dsatz（the　fundamental　sentence　or　symbol
quintessential　to　philosophy　as　the”science　of　the　first　principle”）to　the
effect　that”pure　experience　is　the　sole　reality．”According　to　Ueda，　the
second　dimension　further　gives　rise　to　the　third　dimension，　discursive
philosophical　thinking　per　se　aiming　at　explaining　all　things　f『om　the
standpoint　of　the”science　of　totality．”10　From　this　perspective，　we　can　divide
Nishida「s　philosophy　ofpure　experience　into　three　stages：
Stage　A：”Pure　experience．”The　first　stage　is　the　bare　fact　of　an　ineffable
　　occurrence　which　can　be　designated　as　awareness　pure　and　simple．
Stage　B：”Pure　experience　is　the　sole　reality．”The　second　stage　consists　of　a
　　Grundsatz　or　fundamental　statement　or　symbol　quintessential　to
　　philosophy　as　the”science　of　the　first　principle　or　of　reality．鱒
Stage　C：”I　would　like　to　explain　all　things　on　the　basis　of　pure　experience　as
　　the　sole　reality．”The　third　stage　shows　Nishida冒s　philosophical　enterprise
　　as　a　whole　as　pertinent　to　the，’science　of　totality　or　of　explanation”or　to
　　metaphysics．
　　It　is　to　be　noted，　however，　that　contrary　to　Nishida’s　initial　intention，　in　the
actual　development　of　his　philosophy，　as　he　himself　dwelt　upon　it　anew　in
the”Upon　Resetting　the　Type”of．4η1吻〃のノinto　the　Good　in　l　936，　Nishida
had　to　radically　reconsider　this　three－stage　unfblding　of　the　standpoint　of
pure　experience　into　the”science　of　the　first　principle脚and　ft1rther　into　the
韓science　of　totality．”　And　this　process　of　radical　reconsideration　took　place
in　Nishida’s　philosophical　career，　first，　in　lntuition　and．Reflection　in　Self－
Awareness（1917）by　introducing　the　standpoint　of”absolute　free　will
looking　back　upon　itself’（i．e．，　self：awareness）and，　then，　in　the　second　half
of　Fro〃1　the　Actor　to　the　Seer（1927）through　the　mediation　of　the　Greek
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philosophical　conception　of”place”（IG，　xxxi－xxxiii）．　Significantly　enough，
the　significance　of”placell　culminates　in　his　last　essay”The　Logic　of　Place
and　the　Religious　Worldview”11　which　was　posthumously　published　in　1946
by　Iwanami　Shoten．
　　Those　in　Japanese　philosophical　circles　know　Nishida’s　above－mentioned
threefbld　philosophical　development　as　a　philosophical　su切ect－matter　which
attracts　the　attention　of　philosophers　of　different　concerns，　such　as
Whiteheadians，　as　the　basis　fbr　a　new　intelpretation．　Hence，　I　have　recently
written　a　piece　entitled　1’A　Whiteheadian　Reinterpretation　of　Nishida’s
Philosophy　ofPure　Experience：With　the　Concept　of　Symbolic　Reference　As
Guide”i2　for　a　volume　edited　by　Franz　Riffert　of　Salzburg　University．　Now，
it　seems　to　me，　however，　that　Nishida，s　threefbld　philosophical　development
might　be　acknowledged　to　have　a　pedagogical　implication　if　seen　against　the
background　of　Whitehead，s　process　pedagogy　of　rhythm　consisting　of　the
three　stages　of　romance，　precision，　and　generalization．　There　would　be　a
pedagogical　turn　in　the　studies　of　Nishida’s　philosophy　if　explored　in
relation　to　Whitehead曾s　pedagogy　as　developed　in　the　work　at　issue　in　the
present　essay．　This　would　give　rise　to　what　1　might　call　Buddhist－C㎞stian
pedagogy　in　a　process　perspective．
Concluding　Remarks：
　　First，　fbr　me　to　envision　the　idea　of　a　Buddhist－Christian　pedagogy　in　a
process　perspective，　the　fbllowing　passage丘om　Whitehead　is　cmcial　in　that
it　elicits　the　two　sides　of　wisdom　in　pedagogy：on　the　one　hand，　remotively
（removendo）denying　precision　fbr　the　sake　of　romance，　thus　accounting　fbr
the　importance　of　reverence，　and　on　the　other，　constitutively（constituendo）
going　beyond　romance　fbr　the　sake　of　precision，　thus　coming　to　terms　with
the　duty　of，”justifying　the　ways　of　God　to　humanity”：13
［Remotively］It　is　evident　that　a　stage　of　precision　is　barren　without　a
previous　stage　of　romance：unless　there　are　factS　which　have　already　been
vaguely　apPrehended　in　their　l）road　generality，　the　previous　analysis　is　an
analysis　of　nothing．　It　is　simply　a　series　of　meaningless　statements　about
bare　factS，　produced　artificially　and　Without　any　funher　relevance．
【ConstitUtively］　1　repeat　that　in　this　stage　we　do　no　merely　remain　within　the
11
c廿cle　of出e耽鱈elicited血the　romantic　epoch．　The　factS　of　romance　have
disclosed　ideas　with　possibilities　of　wide　significance，　and　in　the　stage　of
precise　progress　we　acquire　other　factS　in　a　systematic　order，　which　thereby
fbnn　both　a　disclosure　and　an　analysis　of　the　general　suhlect－matter　of　the
romance．（AE，18－19）
　　These　two　sides　of　wisdom　constitute　a　paradox　inherent　in　Whitehead，s
pedagogy　of　rhythm　which　is　to　be　accounted　fbr　by　the　third　stage，
generaliZatiOn．
　　Second，　re　fening　to　my　own　personal　instance　of　religious　education，　I
used　to　tell　my　students，”If　I　said　that　the　philosophy　or　religion　you　study
with　me　is　the　best　thing　in　the　world，　I　would　be　a　liar．　Your　life　itself　is　far
more　important　than　any　kind　of　leaming，　including　philosophy　and　religion．
But　it　is　precisely　when　you　notice　that　your　life　itself　is　far　more　important
than　any　kind　of　learning，　including　Philosophy　or　religion，　you，ve　got
started　doing　philosophy　or　theology．錦This　paradox，　I　believe，　is　at　the　core
of　wisdom；and　as　is　manifested　in　the　above　quotation　from　Whitehead，
pedagogy　is　the　way　in　which　we，　both　teachers　and　students，　are　led　into　an
encounter　with　it．14
　　Third，　let　me　say　a　few　words　about　how　my　idea　of　pedagogy　is
Buddhist－Christian　in　nature．　When　it　comes　to　talking　about　precision　in
terms　of　Nishida’s　way　of　looking　upon　pure　experience（i．e．，　Whitehead，s
romance　in　its　depths）as　the　sole　reality，　we　notice　that　there　are　many　kinds
of　Onlooks　15：Christians　look　upon　Jesus　as　the　sole　reality，　Christ，　whereas
Buddhists　look　upon　everything　as　the　sole　reality，　emptiness．　And　I　hold
that　the　Buddhist　satori　that”everything　is　empty”and　the　Christian
confession　that”Jesus　is　Christ”are　both　tme　in　their　respectively　authentic
constitution　ofOnlooks．
　　There　remains　here，　however，　a　cnlcial　issue　of　how　God　is　related　to
Buddhist　Emptiness（identifiable　with　the　intra－Trinitarian　Godhead），　which
scholars　devoted　to　Buddhist　Chiristian　dialogue　call　the”problem　of　the
two　ultimates．”Iopt　fbr　the　vision　of　God　as　loyal　to　Emptiness　by
scmtinizing　anew　and　Buddhistically　reinterpreting　Karl　Barth’s　argument
for　the　existence　of　God　in／A　nselm’　Fides　euaerens、lntellectum．16
　　Fourth，　I　have　come　to　the　conclusion　that　we　have　unity　in　diversity　in
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the　world　of　religions：namely，　although　we　come　to　be　concemed　with　the
precision　of　life　or　duty　through　a　variety　of　different　Onlooks　or
Grundsatze，　we　are　equally　destined　to　look　upon　something　as　the　Really
Real．　As　Luther　insightfUlly　remarks，”That　now，　I　say，　upon　which　you　set
your　heart　and　put　your　trust　is　properly　your　god．”17　Religious　pedagogy　of
whatever　kind　must　start　from　this　knowledge．　Further，　we　have　to　explain
all　things　on　the　basis　of　pure　experience　or　romance　or　reverence　or
Takizawa’s　Proto－factum　Immanuel　as　the　Really　Real．”The　final　stage　of
generalization，”says　Whitehead，”is　Hege1’s　synthesis．　It　is　a　retum　to
romanticism　with　added　advantage　of　classified　ideas　and　relevant
technique”（AE，19）．
　　Fif止and　last，　a　quick　critical　comment　on　John　Henry　Newman，s
theological　pedagogy　may　be　in　order．　When　we　return　to　romanticism　as
the　source　of　life　deep！y　enough，　then　it　will　give　rise　to　precision　and
generalization　ever　anew．　This　grasp　of　the　paradoxical　matter　of　pedagogy
will　bring　the　insoluble　inconsistencies　in　education　into　harmony．　As　an
example，　we　already　affimled　Soseki’s　pedagogy　of　antinomy　in　the　matters
of　love　and　patriotism　and　Takizawa曾s　remedy．　The　cnlcial　criticisms
against　Newman「s　famous　volume　The」ldea　of　a乙lniversity，18　especially
those　written　by　Sara　Castro－Klaren　in　her　essay　”The　Paradox　of　Self　in　The
ldea　of　aこfniversity，”are　also　worthy　of　notice．　Castro－Klaren　critically
assumes：
The　dialogue　between　Protestants　and　Catholics，　averted　by　Newman’s
hegemonic　response　to　the　Anglican　establishment，　requires　not　sovereignty
but　reciprocity．　His　assertion　of　sovereignty，　however，　justifies　his
avoidance　of　dialogue　and　pluralism．　This　sense　of　equality　and　mutual
need　is　of　course　absent　from　Newman’s　pages，　fbr　his　mind　was
imbued　with　the　sovereignty　and　self」suf行ciency　characteristic　of　the
Victorian　age　and　with”universal　knowledge．”　In　his　idea　of　a
university　there　is　no　need　fbr　reciprocity．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（IU，338）
　　What　Castro－Claren　presupposes　is　the　pictUre　that　the　stUdent　comes，　like
the　catechumen　of　the　early　Christian　church，　to　read　and　leam丘om　the　best
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of　those　who　have　gone　befbre　him．　The　student　walks，　she　continues，　the
well－traveled　path，　not　deviating　from　it　or　cutting　a　new　one．　Seriously
enough，　in　this　sense四the　idea　of　a　university闘denies　the　central　principle　of
”aliberating　education　fbr　human　beings　endowed　with　equal　rights　and
autonomous　su切ectivities”（IU，338）．
But　what　about　a　Buddhist－Christian　deeper　pedagogy　in　which　we　look
upon　God　as　looking　upon　Buddhist　Emptiness　emptying　itselfgua　the　intra－
T血itarian　Godhead，　whom　Meister　Eckhart　designates　Nichts，　as　llgreater”
［maius］19　than　Godself？In　that　case，　the　sovereignty　of　Newma11’s　Deity　will
surely　be　surpassable　not　by　some　creature　or　creatures　but　by　the　beyond－
essence　of　the　Deity，ハrichts，　thus　comlotes　the　sense　of　sovereign　loyalty　to
Emptiness　emptying　itsel£so　as　to　be　paradoxically　tending　to　be　evocative
toward　and　appreciative　of　our　human　reciprocal　su切ectivities．　Then，　the
cause　of　reciprocity　will　go　hand　in　hand　with　a　deeper　sense　of　sovereignty
urged　by　a　Buddhist－Christian　pedagogy　of　the　rhythm　of　threefbld
processes・
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